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[Crim. No.1030S. In Bank.

Apr. 25, 1967.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDWARD
DEAN GRIFFIN, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Discharge of Jury Unable
to Agree.-On retrial of a murder case, the stipulated fact
that the jury foreman in the prior trial disclosed in open court
that the jurors, when discharged, stood 10 for acquittal and 2
for second degree murder did not establish implied acquittal of
first degree murder. It may not be inferred from the foreman's
statement that the jurors unanimously agl'eed to acquit of first
degree murder; nor need acquittal be implied as a matter of
policy; and since defendant had not been convicted of a lesser
offense overturned on 'appeal, there was no need to prohibit
retrial for any greater crime to protect the right to appeal.
[2] Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes-E1feet of Aequittal.-Competent and otherwise admissible evidence of another crime is not
made inadmissible by defendant's acquittal of that crime.
[8] Jlomieide-Evidence-Subsequent Conduct: Other Crimes.-In
a murder case, evidence of a rape, of which defendant was

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 135 et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence,
§ 320 et seq.
MeX. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 136; [2, 4] Criminal
Law, §402; [3] Homicide, §§72, 101; [5] Criminal Law, §390(1);
[6] Criminal Law, § 13S3; Homicide, § 266; [7] Witnesses,
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acquitted, was relevant though the alleged rape occurred after
the murder where in both instances defendant became
acquainted with a man living with a common law wife, used
that acquaintance to be invited to the man's home for the
night or longer, and then attacked the woman in the man's
absence; however, the court erred in excluding evidence that
defendant was acquitted of the rape.
Criminal Law-Evidence--Other Crimes-E1fect of Acquittal.
-A properly authenticated acquittal is admissible to rebut
prosecution evidence of defendant's guilt of a crime other than
the one charged.
Id.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Regardless of the probative
value of evidence of other crimes, the admission of such evidence involves the risk of serious prejudice and is always to be
received with extreme caution.
Id. - Appeal- Reversible Error - Exclusion of Evidence:
Homicide-Appeal-Reversible Error-Exclusion of Evidence.
-In a murder case, where proof of an intent to rape was
crucial to the prosecution's felony-murder theory and proof of
defendant's rape in Mexico after the murder was crucial in
proving an intent to rape, it was reasonably probable a result
more favorable to defendant would have been reached had the
jury been allowed to consider his acquittal of the rape in
Mexico, and exclusion of evidence of that acquitt'al was prejudicialerror resulting in a miscarriage of justice and requiring
reversal. (Const., art. VI, § 13.)
Witnesses-Impeachment and Contradiction-Collateral Matter Adduced on Cross-examination.-In a murder case, where a
witness on cross-examination by defendant denied telling
investigating officers of an arrangement whereby defendant
was to sleep with the victim in return for money paid to the
witness, defendant's offer of proof, to impeach this statement,
by an officer's testimony that he had been told by the witness
that his buddies had told him of such an arrangement with
defendant was not inconsistent with the witness' testimony on
cross-examination, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the offer of proof.

APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. John G. Barnes, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty reversed.

)

Erling J. Hovden, Public Defender, Charles A. Maple and
James L. McCormick, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant.
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Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, and James H. Kline, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaiutiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant was sentenced to death for
the murder of Essie Mae Hodson. This appeal is automatic.
(Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
There have been three trials. In the first, defendant was
found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death.
On automatic appeal we affirmed the jUdgment. (People v.
Griffin, 60 Ca1.2d 182 [32 Cal.Rptr. 24, 383 P.2d 432J.) The
United States Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
prosecutor's comments and the trial court's instructions to
. the jury concerning defendant's failure to take the stand and
testify violated the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [12 L.Ed.2d 653, 84 S.Ct. 1489]. (Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 8.Ct. 1229].)
In the second trial the jury was discharged and a mistrial
declared when the jury failed to reach a verdict. Based on
this fact, defendant moved to enter a plea of once in jeopardy
to the charge of first degree murder. The motion was denied,
the case proceeded to the third trial, and the jury found
defendant guilty of first degree murder and fixed the punishment at death.
The evidence disclosed the following events.
On December 2, 1961, Eddie Seay and a friend he knew as
Al met defendant on a Los Angeles sidewalk. Defendant
asked them for directions to the 41st Street Club, a beer and
wine bar in the neighborhood. He also asked the two men
where they were going and, learning that they were on their
way to buy a bottle of wine, gave them a quarter toward the
price. The group then parted, defendant presumably heading
for the 41st Street Club.
Seay and Al bought and drank the wine and about 9 p.m.
entered the 41st Street Club. Essie Mae Hodson, who had been
living with Seay for about three years, was sitting at a booth
with two friends. Seay and Al joined the group at the booth,
and defendant, who had been standing at the bar, also joined
them at Seay's invitation. They talked and drank wine and
beer purchased by defendant. During the evening Al and
Essie Mae's friends left the booth, and between midnight and
1 a.m. Essie May went home to' bed. Defendant and Seay
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stayed at the bar drinking coffee until about 2 a.m. Because it
was late, defendant asked Seay if he could spend the night in
the apartment shared by Seay and Essie May. Seay agreed,
and the two men left the bar together.
Seay and Essie Mae lived in an upstairs apartment of a
four-unit building. Essie Mae was asleep in the bedroom when
Seay and defendant arrived. Seay prepared a daybed in the
living room for defendant and then went to bed with Essie
Mae. He was awakened later by a noise in the living room. He
got out of bed and saw defendant and Essie Mae struggling---on the daybed. Essie Mae told Seay that defendant had put
his hand over her mouth and tried to force her to have sexual
relations with him. Seay suggested to defendant that they go
out for coffee and took him down the back stairs. At the
bottom of the stairs Seay told defendant to wait for a minute.
He then left defendant, returned to the apartment by another
stairway, and went back to bed with Essie Mae.
A few minutes later Seay heard knocking at the back door
and defendant calling to be let in. He then heard glass breaking, got out of bed, put on his pants, and went back toward
the door. He found defendant standing in the living room.
Again. S~ay suggested that they go out for coffee, and again
the two men went down the back stairs. Defendant at the time
was making "muaning" sounds and kept repeating that he
wanted to return to the apartment. When they reached the
bottom of the stairs, defendant hit Seay twice, knocking him
to the ground. Seay got up and ran to the 41st Street Club for
help, There 'he found a man called Piggy-bank who agreed to
return to the apartment with him. When they arrived defendant and Essie Mae were gone. Seay never saw her alive
again.
About 7 on the morning of December 3 Alfredo Villasenor
went to an alley about 300 feet from Essie Mae's apartment
to look for scrap wood. In the alley was a very large trash box
used for sawdust and scrap. Villasenor saw defendant coming
out of the box buttoning up his pants and asked him what he
was doing. Defendant replied, "Nothing," and walked away.
Villasenor looked into the trash box and saw Essie Mae. She
was trembling and appeared to have been beaten.
The police were called. When they arrived, the officers
found Essie Mae seated at the front of the trash box. She was
dressed only in a long robe that was wet and dirty. She was
shivering, bleeding from the head, had scratches on the backs
of her hands, and appeared to be in shock. Her responses to
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questions were largely incoherent, and the police were able to
learn nothing more than her name. The trash box was bloodstained; in the box was the wig that Essie Mae always wore.
Essie Mae was taken to a hospital where she died the next
day. An autopsy revealed two large abrasions on her head,
indicating that she either had been struck with or had fallen
against a solid object at least twice. There were multiple abrasions and scratches on her face, chest, ankles, and on the backs
of her hands. There were no bruises, tears, or other indications of forcible rape in the vicinity of the thighs or external
genitalia, nor was there evidence of sperm. According to the
pathologist who performed the autopsy, however, there would
normally be no sperm present 24 or at most 48 hours after
intercourse. The pathologist further testified that, judging
from the nature of her injuries, it was unlikely that Essie
Mae would have voluntarily participated in sexual intercourse
or that she would have been able to resist sexual attack.
Further, he felt that with her injuries she probably would
have been unable to walk the 300 feet from the apartment
stairway to the trash box without assistance.
After the attack on Essie Mae, defendant went to Mexicali,
Mexico. There, in mid-December, he met Willie Kerr, who was
living with Amanda Encinas. Kerr knew defendant as Willie
Lee Fairchild. Defendant obtained work at a cotton mill in EI
Centro, California, where Kerr also worked. Kerr agreed to
allow defendant to stay at his home in MexicalL
On December 16, before Kerr went to work, he told Amanda
that defendant would be coming to stay with them and
instructed her to make defendant's breakfast when he came.
When defendant arrived, he motioned to Amanda, who spoke
only Spanish, that he wanted a towel. She testified that when
she took the towel to defendant, he grabbed her, pushed her
out of the kitchen and into another room, began to beat her,
forced her to disro~e, threw her on the bed, and attempted to
have intercourse with her. Amanda testified through an interpreter t.hat during the attempt defendant said he would kill
her in five minutes. Kerr returned home from work about
noon. He found Amanda in her slip and defendant in the
process of putting on his trousers. Kerr pushed Amanda and
threatened defendant. The police, who had probably been
called by neighbors, arrived and took Amanda, Kerr, and
defendant to jail. Defendant was charged with rape, tried,
and acquitted. He was subsequently arrested in Mexicali for'
the murder of Essie Mae.
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[1] We first consider defendant's contention that his
third trial placed him twice in jeopardy of first degree
murder. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code, § 1023.) The
jury at the second trial was discharged after failing to reach
a unanimo,!s verdict, and a mistrial was declared. (Pen. Code,
§§ 1140, 1141.) After the jury was discharged, the foreman
disclosed in open court that the jurors had stood 10 for
acquittal and 2 for guilty of second degree murder. The trial
court refused to make this information a matter of record, but
the prosecution and defendant stipulated to the fact before
the beginning of the third trial. Defendant contends that this
fact establishes an implied acquittal of first degree murder.
This contention must be rejected. Defendant does not deny
that the jury was properly discharged pursuant to Penal
Code section 1140. (Compare Paulson v. Superior Court, 58
Ca1.2d 1; 5 [22 Cal.Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d 641].) We may not
infer from the foreman's statement that the jury had unanimously agreed to acquit of first degree murder. There is no--reliable basis in fact for such an implication, for the jurors
had not completed their deliberations and those voting for
second degree murder may have been temporarily compromising in an effort to reach unanimity. Nor need we "imply" an
acquittal as a matter of policy. Defendant has not had a
conviction of a lesser offense overturned on appeal, and it is
therefore not necessary to prohibit retrial for any greater
crime to protect the right to appeal. (Compare Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 [2 L.Ed.2d 199, 78 8.Ct. 221, 61
A.L.R.2d 1119] ; Gomez v. Superim' Court, 50 Cal.2d 640 [328
P.2d 976] ; People v. Henderson, 60 Ca1.2d 482 [35 Cal.Rptr.
77,386 P.2d 677].)
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting
the evidence of the subsequent attack on Amanda in Mexico,
on the ground that he was acquitted of that crime. [2] It
is settled, however, that competent and otherwise admissible
evidence of another crime is not made inadmissible by reason
of the defendant's acquittal of that crime. (People v. Griffin.
60 Ca1.2d 182, 191 [32 Cal.Rptr. 24, 383 P.2d 432J.; People v.
Frank, 28 Cal. 507; People v. Fox, 126 Cal.App.2d 560 r272
P.2d 832] ; People v. Lewis, 105 Cal.App.2d 208 [233 P.2d
30] ; People v. Follette, 74 Ca1.App. 178 [240 P. 502] ; Note,
86 A.L.R.2d 1132; see McBaine, Cal. Evidence Manual (2d ed.
1960) § 637, p. 220.)
[3] In the present case the evidt:>ncp of the subsequent
crime was admissible because the similarities between the
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crimes made evidence of the later crime relevant to prove that
Essie Mae's injuries were not accidental but inflicted by
defendant and to prove that he intended to rape her. The
evidence tended to prove that in both instances defendant
became acquainted with a man living with a common law
wife, used that acquaintance to be invited to the man's home
for the night or longer, and then attacked the woman in the
. man's absence. Under these circumstances, the evidence of the
other crime is relevant even though it occurred after instead
of before the crime charged, and the chronology of the crimes
does not therefore aiIect the admissibility of the evidence of
the subsequent crime. (People v. Ooe/ield, 37 Cal.2d 865, 870
[236 P.2d 570] ; People v. Ferdinand, 194 Cal. 555, 561 [229
P.341].)
The trial court erred, however, in excluding evidence on the
issue of guilt thnt defendant was acquitted of the subsequent
crime by a Mexican court. Although there is authority to the
contrary (Note, 86 A.L.R.2d 1132, 1135, 1145-46), the better
rule allows proof of an acquittal to weaken and rebut the
prosecution's evidence of the other crime. (People v. Frank,
28 Cal. 5W, 515; People v. Lancaster, 148 Cal.App.2d 187, 194
1306 P.2d' 626] ; People v. Fox, 126 Cal.App.2d 560, 569 [272
P.2d 832] ; People v. Follette, 74 Cal.App. 178, 212 [240 P.
502] ; Pilcher v. United States (5th Cir. 1902) 113 F. 248, 249
[51 C.C.A. 205] ; Note, 86 A.L.R.2d 1132, 1144-45.)
The Attorney General contends that evidence of acquittal
of another crime should not be admissible to prove that a
defendant was not guilty of that crime, on the ground that
the acquittal is only the hearsay opinion of another factfinder
based on evidence presented at- another time and place. The
same objection could be made to the use of many other official
records as admissible hearsay, and, accordingly, it would be
anomalous to treat judgments differently from other properly
authenticated official documents when they are offered, not as
res judicata, but tor their evidentiary value alone. (See
McCormick, Evidence (1954) § 295, pp. 618-19; 5 Wigmore,
Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1671a, pp. 688-89.)1 [4] Whatever merit there may be to denying judgments evidentiary
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lWigmore has suggested that the exclusion of judgments under many
circumstances has been due to a failure to distinguish between treating
them as conclusive proof of facts stated and treating them merely as
admissible evidence of those facts, subject to rebuttal. (See 5 Wigmore,
Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1671a, p. 688. See also id. at p. 694; 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1346a, p. 671.)
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value in other contexts, 2 we are convinced that we should not
depart from the rule that a properly authenticated acquittal
is admissible to rebut prosecution evidence of guilt of another
crIme.
[5] Regardless of its probative value, evidence of ether
crimes always involves the risk of serious prejudice, and it is
therefore always "to be received with 'extreme caution.' "
(People v. Albertson, 23 Cal.2d 550, 577 [145 P.2d 7].)
Indeed, for this very reason some courts have concluded that
an acquittal so attenuates the weight that may properly be
given evidence of another crime as to require the exclusion of
such evidence altogether. (See People v. Ulrich, 30 Il1.2d 94,
101 [195 N.E.2d 180] ; State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 307 [350
P.2d 756, 86 A.L.R.2d 1120].) Our rule does not go that far,
but instead is fair to both the prosecution and the defense by
assisting the jury in its assessment of the significance of the
evidence of "another crime with the knowledge that at another
time and place a duly constituted tribunal charged with the
very issue of determining defendant's guilt or innocence of
the other crime concluded that he was not guilty. S
[6] The error in excluding the evidence of the Mexican
acquittal was prejudicial. The admission of the evidence of
the Mexica,n crime may' well have spelled the difference
between a jury divided 10 for acquittal to 2 for conviction of
second degree murder and a jury unanimous for first degree
murder. Proof of an intent to rape was crucial to the prosecu..
tion's felony murder theory, and proof of the Mexican crime
was crucial in proving an intent to rape. Had the jury been
allowed to consider the determination of the Mexican tribunal, its consideration of the evidence of that crime would have
been materially affected. We therefore conclude that in the
absence of the error it is reasonably probable that a result
more favorable to defendant would have been reached.
Accordingly, the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice,
2It is noteworthy that under the new Evidence Code judgments of
felony conviction are made admissible evidence under certain circumstances. (Evid. Code, § 1300.)
3The Mexican judgment stated that any injuries to Amanda Encinas
were caused by Willie Kerr, her common law husband, and that any
sexual relations between defendant and Amanda were not the result of
physical or moral violence or force. Amanda had complained that she
had been forcibly raped; defendant declared that she had offered to have
intercourse for nve dollars.
Because of the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, evidence of an acquittal is not, of course, as convincing of innocence as a judgment of conviction is convincing of guilt; but this fact
goes to the weight not the admissibility of the evidence.
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and the judgment must be reversed. (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13;· People v. lVatson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)
[7] We discuss one further issue because the question is
likely to arise again at a new trial. On cross-examination by
defendant, Eddie Seay denied that he had ever told investigating officers of an arrangement whereby defendant was to
sleep with Essie Mae in return for a payment of money to
Seay. In an offer of proof, defendant wished to impeach this
statement by an officer's testimony to the effect that he had
been told by Seay that Seay's buddies had told Seay that he
had made such an arrangement with defendant. Seay had not
been asked on cross-examination if he had told the investigating officers of the information given him by his friends, and
the notes of the investigating officer state that Seay denied
ever making any such arrangement, although he admitted that
he was intoxicated at the relevant time. The statement offered
by defendant was not inconsistent with Seay's testimony that
he had never told the officers that he had made the arrangement with defendant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the evidence. (See Western Union Oil 00. v.
Newlove, 145 Cal. 772, 775-776 [79 P. 542].)
The judgment is reversed.
'Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Sullivan,
curred.

J.,

and White,

J.,t

con-

BURKE, J.-I dissent. In my opinion it is not reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have
been reached had the evidence of his acquittal of the Mexican
crime been admitted at his trial on guilt. (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13;· People v. Watson,46 Cal.2d 818,836 [299 P.2d 243].)
Evidence of that acquittal was admitted at the penalty trial,
and it is apparent that it had no effect upon the jury since the
jury returned the death penalty.
There is overwhelming evidence that defendant killed Essie
Mae Hodson in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,
rape. Evidence of the incident in Mexico several weeks later,
indicating a similar plan, scheme and design was highly relevant as to defendant's illicit motives in introducing himself
into the household of an acquaintance. Whether in the Mexi-Reporter's Note: Amendment adopted November 8, 1966.
tRetired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

can incident he accomplished his objectives by means of rape
by force or by inducement was relatively unimportant. It was
the bearing which the Mexican incident had on his intentions
which was significant.
.
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
McComb, J., concurred.

